

DDI #

977-77

11 MAR 1977

Executive Registry

77-3648/1

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI

SUBJECT: Unclassified Civil Defense Statement

1. We have tried to prepare a statement along the lines drafted by you; as you can see we have been forced to make some important departures. We are satisfied that sources and methods are protected against specific identification in the paper and that the limited quantification of effectiveness included is reasonably derived, though uncertain.

2. The paper previously provided you for possible declassification has been reviewed by members of the interagency working group that prepared the original Intelligence Memorandum on civil defense, though not by the NFIB itself. This paper breaks some new ground which has not been coordinated throughout the Community. Because of the attention being given this topic and the importance of the Community-wide analytical and collection program now underway, I recommend that you inform the NFIB principals of your intention to release an unclassified statement on civil defense prior to doing so. Some contact with those members of Congress who have been pushing hard for an unclassified release would also seem to be in order.

3. We are prepared to do whatever more you may wish on this matter. It is the fragmentary nature of the data in hand and the lack of any valid method for extrapolating them to the country as a whole that has restrained our response to your draft proposal and not disagreement with your aims or approach.



Sayre Stevens

Deputy Director for Intelligence

cc: DDCI

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State Dept. review completed

DDI-927-77

Subject: Unclassified Civil Defense Statement

Dated 11 March 1977

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Orig. S.Stevens, 11 March

Distribution:

Orig - DCI
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10 MAR 1977

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The Soviet Civil Defense Program

We cannot, at this time, make a comprehensive assessment of the potential effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program. Our accumulation of factual information has not yet reached the point at which we can make confident projections of a nationwide program. We expect our base of information to improve over the coming months--right now, though, we have enough data to know that projections from a small sample, such as the number of shelters in a single area, could lead to very misleading quantitative answers about the overall Soviet program.

We can, however, make some confident qualitative assessments which help to keep the problem in perspective.

--We know that the Soviets have an ambitious program and we have a good understanding of their overall civil defense doctrine and organization. We lack important details about specific plans, programs, and objectives.

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--We know that the Soviets are taking some action with respect to all aspects of civil defense. We lack evidence on the progress they are making in many of their preparations.

--Some analysts of this problem have reached alarming conclusions by assuming that the Soviets have, in fact, implemented all the measures called for in their civil defense manuals. Our evidence on the actual status of Soviet preparations, however, indicates that this is not the case.

--On the other hand, the activity we see clearly reflects an effort on the part of the USSR to improve its ability to survive a nuclear war. The Soviet program is much more than a "paper plan" as some have suggested.

I. Circumstances

The adequacy of Soviet Civil Defense must be judged against different levels of possible counter-attack by the United States ranging from attack by the full inventory of US strategic weapons to attack by the reduced number that would be expected to survive a Soviet first strike. For purposes of this analysis a "worst case" (a reduced

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US retaliatory capability) is assumed. We have also assumed that the Soviets would have had at least a week to implement civil defense preparations.

The Soviet calculation of their own civil defense effectiveness would be a much more conditional one and would have to include such factors as whether extensive preparations and evacuation of cities would provide warning to the US and hence cause an increase in the number of weapons which could be used in retaliation or a change in the targetting of these weapons.

II. Parameters

The following are basic criteria for measuring the effectiveness of civil defense:

1. Ability to protect key government leaders.
2. Ability to protect the population as a whole.
 - evacuation
 - sheltering
 - sustenance
3. Ability to protect economic capacity for post-war recovery.
 - industrial facilities
 - essential personnel
 - strategic reserves

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III. Protection of Leadership

Within a broad range of possible US weapons allocation, the existing Soviet civil defense endeavors probably would insure the survival of a large percentage of the military and civilian leaders needed to maintain government and party control.

IV. Protection of the Population

Soviet plans for the evacuation of cities are feasible. Evacuation to rural areas would be critical to population survival because hardened shelters, including subways, currently available in the cities would accommodate only a small fraction of the total population--probably no more than five or ten percent of the population in most cities.

Under the favorable conditions enumerated above and with an effective evacuation, prompt casualties to the urban population could be reduced to a small percentage. Soviet plans for the construction of expedient shelters by evacuees in rural areas are also technically feasible. The quality of fallout protection for evacuees probably would vary widely.

Soviet stocks of food and fuel are widely distributed throughout the country, rather than being concentrated in major urban centers. Most of these stocks have no special protection. We have identified special grain storage bunkers which could provide for only some three percent of annual peacetime food-grain

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consumption and represent less than one percent of total Soviet grain storage capacity. Owing to the widespread locations of normal storage facilities, however, large quantities of grain could be expected to survive an attack. It is believed that the surviving population could be fed for at least weeks and probably months from existing stocks.

Some analysts have employed data of a single urban area--the best information we have--to extrapolate shelter capacity for the entire USSR. We doubt that this is a valid technique because our evidence indicates that the pace of the shelter program is not uniform across the whole of the USSR. Nevertheless, such a calculation (incorporating uncertainties in data) leads to the following estimates of the percentage of population which could currently be housed in hardened shelters.

Total Population	1-3%
Urban Population	2-7%
Urban Work Force	3-13%
Essential Workers	7-27%

This sort of estimate could easily be wrong by a factor of two either way (from half to double).

A similar simplified extrapolation to future capability, based on very limited information about construction rates, indicates that the above numbers could be roughly doubled in about ten years.

No agency of the intelligence community has officially estimated the numbers of population which they believe the Soviet program would protect.

V. Protection of the Economy

While light industry has been dispersed somewhat in the USSR, heavy industry remains concentrated in large urban areas. The industrial expansion of the past 15 years has not significantly reduced this urban concentration, although the expansion of plants and cities has had some dispersing effect.

There is little evidence that the Soviets have made extensive preparations to harden individual industrial facilities. The amount of effort required to protect key industrial equipment would range from moderate--machine tools, for example are relatively hard to disable--to extensive--chemical plants have a complex arrangement of interdependent equipment.

The estimates cited above indicate that in their program to build urban shelters, the Soviets are concentrating on the protection of essential workers in key industries rather than protecting the population at large. Trained vital defense formations exist at many industrial facilities. Such information would be helpful in restoring damaged facilities and, in some instances, could undertake hasty hardening measures prior to an attack.

The Soviets maintain reserves of industrial materials, and large quantities of material are

normally in the production pipeline.

VI. The Soviet Perspective

As I have indicated, we in the US have many uncertainties about the facts of the Soviet civil defense program. The Soviets themselves, in considering any actions which depend on the protection afforded by their civil defenses, would have to consider many uncertainties in its effectiveness. Some of these factors are not under Soviet control. Among the uncertain factors the Soviets would have to contemplate are:

-- Climate and weather during evacuation could have a large influence on the ability of the population to shelter and sustain itself outside urban areas.

-- The details of the US attack would influence which leaders survived, which economic facilities were destroyed, and how much radioactive fallout was produced to cause post-attack fatalities.

-- Distribution of food, medical care, industrial supplies, etc., would be at least as critical to recovery as the materials themselves.

-- The range of possible responses by the US to civil defense preparations would have to include preemptive attack, increased alert rates, retargeting to concentrate on leadership and population fatalities, etc.

VII. Conclusion

It is not the conclusion of the DCI or any agency of the intelligence community that the the Soviets today possess a civil defense capability that would enable them to feel that they could absorb a retaliatory strike from the United States with a reasonable expectation of limiting damage to an acceptable level.

However, the fact that the Soviet Union is currently making a far more substantial investment in civil defense than the United States must be considered. The least it indicates is that Soviet leaders feel that they must make some preparation for the possibility of strategic nuclear warfare. This does not necessarily mean that they are planning to initiate such warfare; it does mean that they apparently are thinking through the consequences of there being at least some exchange of nuclear weapons and planning for a post-attack recovery. This is in contrast with general attitudes in the western world where the emphasis is almost exclusively on the deterrence of of nuclear warfare.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	D/DCI/IC		X		
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/NI	X			
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI	X			
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	D/EE0				
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks: To 5 & 8: Please note attached from Admiral Turner and refine his draft.

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7 Mar 77
 Date

S-17.3

WASHINGTON

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Admiral Turner
will hold a press
conference on this
Monday. March 14.

THE WHITE HOUSE
/WASHINGTON/

The Tape on this was
a little rough. If this
outline conveys your
thoughts, I will pass
it on 'DDI/Admcom.

Go - in rough - ^{us}
urgent - 2

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BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

The Soviets appear to have serious morale and discipline problems throughout their armed forces. Although evidence is fragmentary, the more frequent indications of high-level concern suggest that the situation has become worse in the last few years. While there is not enough evidence to assess the full extent of the problem or the impact it might have on combat effectiveness, what is known suggests that the causes are primarily systemic in nature and probably beyond Soviet abilities to resolve.

The Symptoms

The growing body of evidence of Soviet military morale and discipline problems which has accumulated over the past several years has been highlighted by two spectacular incidents--the mutiny and narrowly thwarted escape to Sweden of an anti-submarine ship last spring and the more recent defection of Senior Lieutenant Belenko to Japan. The evidence relates to individual incidents and most of it could be interpreted as no more than the normal problems found in any large military establishment, but collectively, it seems to reflect a widespread and endemic disaffection. The major symptoms in addition to the dramatic incidents noted above are:

- alcoholism, a widespread problem in the military (as well as civilian) sector which the leadership has been unable to curb;
- desertion at high rates throughout the armed services;
- frequent suicides, particularly among units in remote areas.

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Report No. 758
March 17, 1977

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The Apparent Causes

The causes are undoubtedly numerous and probably include a general Soviet social malaise and new generational attitudes, but the factors that follow are the ones most frequently cited in defector, emigre, and intelligence reports.

- Military living conditions, which are falling behind the relative advances of the civilian sector, are considered insufferable, especially in many isolated areas. While officers have gradually received greater pay and benefits, the individual soldier has received only 4-5 rubles per month for nearly 20 years.
- Discipline, harsh and arbitrary, extends to superior officers as well as to the offender because disciplinary problems are considered a result of poor command and ideological motivation.
- Officer-enlisted relations are structured and remote.
- Training is rigid and repetitive, leaving little room for individual responsibility, initiative, and innovation.
- Political indoctrination is resented by all ranks, not only because it is considered irrelevant and repetitive, but more particularly because it infringes on what little free time is available.

In sum, Soviet military personnel are overburdened and generally unrewarded. Belenko, as a Senior Lieutenant in the Air Defense Forces, has added valuable insights to the general observations above:

- for half of his leave time, Belenko was forced to attend a state-controlled sanitarium, where he underwent the same political indoctrination that absorbed his off-duty time during regular training;
- every move for each scheduled flight is rehearsed on the ground the previous day under the supervision of a senior pilot;
- according to Belenko, there is an unwritten code of military conduct that one must neither excel nor underachieve.

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Roots of the Problem

Beyond these personal irritants lie more serious, systemic problems for Soviet military morale and discipline. There is a traditional, rigid system of rank and privilege coupled with a demand for strict obedience to orders and regulations, which stifles initiative down the line. Further, unnecessarily harsh discipline is often the result of junior officers executing regulations and performance requirements issued in detail from the top. In the Russian tradition, moreover, the General Staff retains and exercises total control over the entire chain of command. For example, it is not unusual for the Minister of Defense or Marshals to personally control exercises and critique training--even of small units.

Perhaps the most important systemic problem is the dual chain of command--political and military. Layered into the military structure is the Communist Party apparatus headed by Army General Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration. There has been a traditional conflict between military commanders and unit political officers over authority, discipline, and the allocation of time between military and political training. Although commanders and political officers may often work well together, the separate political chain of command undercuts the authority of the unit commander and is another factor in stifling initiative.

The Soviet Solution

There is no doubt that the Soviet high command has taken the discipline situation seriously and that it could probably relieve much of the problem merely by improving living conditions, pay, and benefits. What it probably cannot do is relieve the tensions that result from fear of failure, mistrust, and the interference of the party machinery in military life, since this would require a devolution of authority and responsibility and the unacceptable risk of a politically unguided military establishment. Instead, the high command has taken actions to correct what it sees as a failure of command leadership, all of which seem likely to exacerbate the existing problems:

- High-level meetings of commanders have been held to address discipline problems and adherence to the new service regulations issued in 1975, which call for strict and unswerving obedience to orders and more severe disciplinary measures for violators.

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- Commanding officers and their entire staffs have been removed from some units because of poor performance.
- Political training has been increased and has been given more emphasis by Ustinov, the new Minister of Defense. Soon after taking office in April 1976, he called for vigorous "party verification," a reference to the obligation of political officers to report failures of regular officers.
- General officers become personally involved in relatively minor individual cases of desertion, misuse of weapons, and drinking.
- Security and control procedures appear to have been increased to prevent further embarrassing incidents of defections.

Possible Effects on Performance

While it is risky to translate different cultural patterns into comparative performance, it may be possible to draw certain limited conclusions about the effect of the Soviet military system on its combat effectiveness in contrast with that of Western forces.

Despite the rhetoric for more command initiative, the Soviets will rely on detailed operations plans and strict obedience to orders from the General Staff. If individuals and units perform according to plan and circumstances are accurately predicted, the Soviet armed forces should be very effective in combat. However, when faced with the unexpected and/or when orders cannot be perfectly executed, Soviet combat efficiency could be seriously degraded.

Distrust of subordinate officers and enlisted men drives the high-level commanders to retain complete control, thus reinforcing the systemic problem. That distrust also becomes a factor in planning operations where there is a risk that complete control cannot be maintained--for example, in an intervention outside the USSR. Even in peacetime, therefore, there are limits on operations and deployments designed to avoid opportunities for defection or contact with the outside environment that could, in themselves, lead to defection or poor morale. These, in turn, undoubtedly limit the reliability and self-confidence of Soviet forces.

Prepared by G. B. Crocker; x28858

Approved by R. H. Baraz; x22043

EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE E.O. 11652: 5B (2)
(Classified by M. Packman)

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Don/Bob Boone

As an mediator,
note that INR is putting
out analyses on military
issues -

I like their competition
in the arena - I question
whether they should be
disseminating on such a
question


long term issue -
Sfr

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29 April 1977

S-17.3

25 Apr

Note For: The Director


I know you are anxious to move ahead quickly on the civil defense memorandum and that you intend to take the subject up with the President this afternoon.

Attached is a version of the civil defense paper which takes account of changes suggested in the earlier draft -- the suggestions having been provided by State/INR and by CIA.

This new version has been examined by the NIO's and DDI and is agreed.

You very likely have considered all of the pros and cons but I do think it worthwhile to point out to you that we remain concerned about the publication of this report now for three reasons. The first is that the report as drafted lends itself to the evidence that either side of a debate will cite. Second, it does reveal to the Soviets the extent of our lack of knowledge. And third, perhaps more important, is the likelihood of U.S. public perception that we have published the study for policy purposes.


I know you feel the need for speed, but my recommendation is that you take time for a discussion of the issues; the discussion to include Agency officers and perhaps some NFIB principals as well.


E. H. Knoche

Attachment

Unclassified Soviet Civil Defense Program paper

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